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How do people think about complex phenomena like the behavior of ecosystems? Here we hypothesize that
people reason about such relational systems in part by creating spatial analogies, and we explore this possibility by
examining spontaneous gestures. In two studies, participants read a written lesson describing positive and negative
feedback systems and then explained the differences between them. Though the lesson was highly abstract and
people were not instructed to gesture, people produced spatial gestures in abundance during their explanations.
These gestures used space to represent simple abstract relations (e.g., increase) and sometimes more complex
relational structures (e.g., negative feedback). Moreover, over the course of their explanations, participants’ gestures
often cohered into larger analogical models of relational structure. Importantly, the spatial ideas evident in the
hands were largely unaccompanied by spatial words. Gesture thus suggests that spatial analogies are pervasive in
complex relational reasoning, even when language does not.
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Many phenomena in the natural and social world involve
complex causal systems. Biological organisms, financial
markets, ecosystems, and mechanical devices, for instance,
all exhibit different types of feedback relationships, in
which multiple causal factors in a system change and
bring about changes in each other. Feedback systems are
central to the STEM fields, as well as to urgent societal
issues such as climate change. Here we investigate the
possibility that people reason about such causal patterns
in part by using spatial analogies—that is, spatial models
of the relations involved. To investigate this possibility, we
had people explain the differences between positive and
negative feedback systems and examined their gestures.
Gesture is ubiquitous in communication and classroom
instruction, and it sometimes expresses spatial ideas not
found in speech. We found that people gestured copiously
when explaining the feedback systems, even though such
systems are not inherently spatial. For example, people* Correspondence: kensy@uchicago.edu
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of space, showed causal relationships as movements
between locations, and modeled the overall behavior of
the systems with complex movements. Interestingly, most
of these spatial gestures were produced without spatial
words. These findings suggest that spatial analogies may
be a pervasive part of people’s on-the-fly reasoning about
complex relational systems, and, further, that gesture may
be an important medium through which such analogies
are expressed. The pervasiveness of spatial analogy in
reasoning about complex phenomena has implications for
how such phenomena are taught in a range of fields.Backround
Permafrost once covered much of the Arctic, but it is
now thawing. This has a number of consequences, but
one is especially insidious: as the frozen ground melts it
releases methane, which then enters the atmosphere
and accelerates the very warming that caused the
ground to thaw in the first place (Anthony, 2009). This
self-reinforcing pattern is an example of a complex
causal system: multiple causal factors—in this case,
atmospheric temperature, melting permafrost, andis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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ing changes in each other. Such systems are legion in
the environmental sciences, but are hardly limited to
them. Further examples can be found in financial mar-
kets, in the human body, in household appliances, in plant
physiology, and beyond. Indeed, complex relational sys-
tems underlie phenomena throughout the natural and so-
cial world, in all domains and on all scales. Yet, despite
the ubiquity of such systems—and their centrality to
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathemat-
ics) fields and to urgent societal issues—much remains to
be learned about the cognitive processes involved in un-
derstanding them. To fully grasp the alarming implica-
tions of permafrost melt, for example, we not only need to
be able to understand the system as it is now, but also to
project its behavior into the future. How do we do this?
Current evidence suggests that complex relational rea-
soning presents challenges even for adults. For example,
undergraduates have considerable difficulty detecting
higher-order causal patterns such as positive feedback
and negative feedback, two important examples of com-
plex relational systems (Rottman, Gentner, & Goldwater,
2012; see also Day, Motz, & Goldstone, 2015) and also
the focus of the present paper. Expertise in identifying
these and other causal patterns can develop, either
through exposure to the same patterns across a range of
domains (Rottman et al., 2012) or through a scaffolded
process of comparing examples (Goldwater & Gentner,
2015). Considerable work has also examined the kinds
of information that people use to make inferences about
other types of causal structure in the world (Lagnado,
Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007; Sloman, 2005),
and has detailed the challenges posed by complex sys-
tems in particular (Chi, Roscoe, Slotta, Roy, & Chase,
2012; Jacobson, Kapur, So, & Lee, 2011). An important
open question, however, concerns the nature of the rep-
resentations that people form as they reason about
causal structure. What is the format of these representa-
tions and, moreover, how can we gain insight into them?
Possible clues come from research on how people
understand complex systems more generally. Much pre-
vious research has investigated how people understand
mechanical processes with multiple causal components,
such as sets of gears and pulleys. A major finding of this
line of work is that people often develop mental models
of the system that are visuospatial in nature (Gentner &
Stevens, 1983; Hegarty, 2004). One line of evidence for
the visuospatial character of these models is that, when
reasoning about or explaining such systems, people
often produce diagrams (Forbus, Usher, Lovett, &
Wetzel, 2011; Novick, 2001; Tversky, 2011) or gestures
(e.g., Kang, Tversky, & Black, 2014; Nathan & Martinez,
2015; Schwartz & Black, 1996). Based on such observa-
tions, it seems plausible that people develop spatial mentalmodels of other types of complex systems, such as the
causal patterns under consideration here. However, there
is a crucial difference between mechanical systems and
positive and negative feedback systems. Positive feedback
and negative feedback are consummate abstractions. They
are relational patterns that may sometimes be instantiated
in mechanical or concretely spatial systems—e.g., a flush
valve toilet, which is an example of a negative feedback
system—but their relational essence transcends any one
concrete instantiation. It might thus seem unhelpful, or
even counterproductive, to recruit visuospatial reasoning
processes when thinking about such pure abstractions.
At the same time, a separate line of research has in-
vestigated how spatial concepts provide a foundation
for more abstract ideas. This tendency can be seen in
the spatial words and grammatical structures people
draw on to talk about abstract domains, including time
and others (Brugman, 1988; Clark, 1973; Heine, 1997;
Jamrozik & Gentner, 2015; Traugott, 1978). In fact, evi-
dence has now accumulated that this is not just a linguis-
tic phenomenon—people draw on spatial representations
when reasoning online about abstract concepts, whether
or not language is involved (Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto
& Bottini, 2014). One vivid and naturalistic source of
evidence for the use of space in abstract reasoning
comes from the gestures people produce (Cienki, 1998;
McNeill, 1992; Núñez, 2008). To date, perhaps the best-
studied case of abstract spatial analogy in gesture—in
which space is used to represent relations that are not
inherently spatial—is the representation of a temporal
sequence as a line. For instance, an English speaker
might reference a future event in speech while locating
it in gesture to their right, tacitly implying a relation
between it and other unnamed events (for a review, see
Cooperrider, Núñez, & Sweetser, 2014). Such temporal
gestures use a simple spatial structure—a line—to cap-
ture a simple relational structure—order along a dimen-
sion—but they raise the possibility that people may
create more complex spatial structures in gesture to rep-
resent more complex relational structures.
The above observations lead us to a hypothesis about
how people reason about complex relational patterns
like positive and negative feedback: they may do so, at
least in part, by creating abstract spatial models of the
relational structures involved—that is, spatial analogies.
Furthermore, if this hypothesis is correct, then gesture
should provide a powerful window onto this phenomenon.
Gesture is well suited to the expression of spatial ideas
(Alibali, 2005), and it has been shown to reveal implicit
aspects of understanding that people have difficulty ver-
balizing (Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow,
2007; Goldin-Meadow, 2003). Moreover, it has been
noted that the spatial information revealed in people’s
abstract gestures sometimes goes beyond what is found in
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& Jasmin, 2012; Cienki, 1998).
In the present studies, we explore this spatial analogy
hypothesis by having people read a lesson about two
types of complex relational systems—positive and nega-
tive feedback—and then explain the key differences
between them. In our materials, we attempted to
encourage highly abstract representations of such
systems, devoid of the kinds of imagery that might
prompt concrete spatial gestures. The most interesting
possibility is that gesture might nonetheless reveal
spatial analogies—that is, spatial models of relational
structure—even though the relations involved in positive
and negative feedback are not inherently spatial.
What would constitute evidence for such spatial analo-
gies? A first kind of evidence would come from individual
gestures that represent abstract relations spatially. These
might include gestures representing simple relational
structures, such as the use of a downward gesture to rep-
resent the notion of a decrease. Though interesting, such
gestures do not necessarily go beyond prior observations
about gestures representing simple relational structures,
such as those described previously in the domain of time.
More interestingly, people could represent complex rela-
tional structures within the confines of a single gesture. To
our knowledge, analogical gestures of this more complex
type have not been investigated in detail. A second kind of
evidence may come from how gestures cohere over the
course of an explanation. People may express complex re-
lational structure—not in a single gesture—but by building
up a spatial model of that relational structure over time.
Gestural models have been observed in extended descrip-
tions of concrete spatial layouts (Emmorey, Tversky, &
Taylor, 2000), but gestural models of purely abstract rela-
tionships have not been described previously. Note, how-
ever, that the abstract nature of causal systems leaves open
the possibility that people might not spatialize much of
anything in their explanations. After all, gesture is thought
to stem from vivid visuospatial or motoric imagery (e.g.,
Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), which was left out of our lesson
by design.
If analogical gestures do occur, a secondary question
concerns how those gestures relate to what people are
saying when they produce them. If people’s abstract
spatial gestures are most often produced along with cor-
responding spatial language—such as an upward gesture
to represent an increase accompanied by “rise”, or a cir-
cular gesture when describing a feedback “loop”—ges-
ture cannot be considered a uniquely revealing source of
evidence for the presence of spatial analogies. Such ges-
tures may be triggered by local lexical effects rather than
by a stable, systematic spatial model of the system (see
Gentner, 2001). However, to the extent that people’s
gestures represent spatial ideas not found in speech,this would suggest that gesture plays a vital role in un-
derstanding the representations people draw on when
reasoning about complex relational systems.
Study 1: Basic causal systems lesson
Methods
The study was approved by the University of Chicago
Institutional Review Board, under protocol #IRB13-0248.
Participants
Twenty three adults from the University of Chicago
community participated for course credit or cash. Four
participants were excluded from the analyses: three be-
cause their gestures were largely occluded on the video;
one for producing no gestures at all. In all, data from
19 participants (10 female; mean age = 20.8 years) are
reported in the analyses.
Materials and procedure
Familiarization phase After giving consent to participate
and to be videotaped, participants carried out a series of
activities that served both to familiarize them with causal
systems and to assess their understanding of the systems.
First, participants completed an adaptation of the Ambigu-
ous Sorting Task (AST) used previously by Rottman et al.
(2012) and Goldwater and Gentner (2015). In this type of
sorting task, participants are given a set of vignettes
printed on index cards and are asked to sort the cards into
categories. Each vignette is an example of one of several
types of causal systems (e.g., positive feedback) instantiated
in one of several domains (e.g., economics). Participants
are also given seed cards—vignettes just like those that
need to be sorted but which serve as anchors for the cat-
egories to be used. A key feature of the task is that the seed
cards leave the relevant categories open to interpretation: a
participant may correctly categorize the vignettes accord-
ing to the type of causal system described (e.g., positive
feedback) or, more concretely, by the domain in which that
system is couched (e.g., economics). In the adaptation of
the AST used here, participants were presented with three
seed cards: a first unlabeled card describing the
phenomenon of stock market bubbles (a positive feedback
system, economics domain), a second unlabeled card de-
scribing predator-prey relationships (a negative feedback
system, natural world domain), and a third card that was
blank except for the word ‘other.’ Participants were then
presented with 11 new vignettes and were given five mi-
nutes to sort them. The vignettes described a range of phe-
nomena, including internet routers, perspiration, interest
rates, and so on, each instantiating a causal system.
After the sorting was complete, the experimenter re-
moved the materials and prompted the participant to
explain the main difference between the different cat-
egories involved in the sorting task. Most participants
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structure between the categories. This phase is the pre-
lesson explanation. Together, the sorting task and the
pre-lesson explanation served to familiarize participants
with causal systems and perhaps prepared them to get
more out of the lesson they would go on to study and
explain (e.g., Little & Bjork, 2016).Causal systems lesson Next, participants were given a
one-page written lesson (‘Causal Systems Lesson’)
explaining the differences between positive and negative
feedback systems (though without using those labels).
The lesson was grounded in the seed cards used in the
sorting task. It explained how the stock market and
predator-prey vignettes exemplify different types of
causal systems (see Appendix 1). The lesson also moved
beyond the particular examples, characterizing in more
abstract terms how each type of system involves different
relationships between causal factors. Importantly, the
lesson used no concrete spatial imagery. This decision
was made to encourage participants to view the systems
as abstractly as possible. It is well known that people
gesture to represent concrete imagery (e.g., McNeill,
1992), but our interest is in the less studied question of
how people gesture when viewing a phenomenon ab-
stractly in terms of its causal structure. Additionally,
the lesson used very little abstract spatial language. Par-
ticipants were instructed to study the lesson for three
minutes and were told that they would later be asked to
explain it to another participant.
When the three minutes were up, the experimenter
removed the lesson and brought in the ‘student’ (who
was actually a confederate). The experimenter then
prompted the participant as follows: “Please explain the
lesson you just read. Go into as much detail as possible,
but focus on the differences between the two types of
causal systems”. The instructions made no mention of
gesture. This phase is the post-lesson explanation.Analysis
Videos of participants’ pre- and post-lesson explanations
were transcribed and analyzed using ELAN video anno-
tation software (https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/).
Participants gestured during both explanations. How-
ever, during the pre-lesson explanations, participants
were highly variable in how much they talked (and thus
how much they gestured), in what they talked about,
and at what level of detail. The analyses reported here
thus focus on the post-lesson explanations, which were
more consistent across participants.
A first step in the gesture analysis was to identify all ges-
tures in the post-lesson explanations that were “represen-
tational” (e.g., Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, & Kita, 2013).Representational gestures depict some property of a refer-
ent (commonly called “iconic” or “metaphoric” gestures),
or point to a referent’s location (commonly called “deictic”
gestures). In the present data, the representational ges-
tures were abstract in nature—that is, they used location,
movement, and spatial arrangement to depict ideas that
themselves had no concrete location, did not actually
move, and had no visible spatial properties. Once repre-
sentational gestures were identified, they were then cate-
gorized into gesture types according to the type of system
element they represented. We then classified the proper-
ties of these gestures, first considered individually and
then considered in relation to other gestures in the ex-
planation. Reliability was assessed by having a second
coder classify the representational gestures in five ran-
domly selected explanations (26% of the data), and it is re-
ported with each analysis. The judgments of the primary
coder were retained for all analyses.
Results
Sorting performance
Participants sorted the vignettes according to the appro-
priate causal structure the majority of the time (M = 0.62,
SD = 0.22). The variability in sorting performance was lim-
ited, however, with three quarters of participants scoring
above 50% (interquartile range = 0.50 to 0.76). This limited
variability made it difficult to explore possible relations be-
tween participants’ sorting performance and their ges-
tures, and such relations are not discussed further.
Spatial ideas in speech
Before analyzing the spatial ideas evident in people’s
gestures, we first examined the spatial ideas evident in
their speech. Based on analogy theory (Gentner, 1983;
Gentner & Markman, 1997), as well as on pilot studies
involving similar materials, we distinguished four ele-
ments of feedback systems that people mention in their
explanations: 1) the factors involved in the system; 2) the
changes those factors undergo; 3) the causal relations
between the factors; and 4) the behavior of the whole
system. We analyzed how often people’s references to
these different aspects of the systems involved overtly
spatial words. A word was considered spatial if the first
dictionary definition for the word uniquely described a
spatial idea, such as location, orientation, size, or motion
(based on American Heritage Dictionary (5th edition);
see Appendix 3 for further details). On this criterion,
words such as “increase,” which has a first definition that
is not uniquely spatial, were not considered spatial; how-
ever, words such as “growth,” which has a first definition
referring uniquely to a change in size, were. In their
post-lesson explanations, participants expressed these
four system elements using spatial words an average of
6.4 (SD = 4.9) times per explanation.
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Rates and types On average, participants’ post-lesson
explanations lasted 88.3 seconds (SD = 33.1) and in-
volved 35.0 gestures (SD = 13.0), for a mean rate of
24.1 (SD = 4.4) representational gestures per minute
speaking. The abstract nature of the Causal Systems
Lesson thus did not stand in the way of eliciting repre-
sentational gestures. Indeed, these rates are comparable
to—or higher than—gesture rates reported in studies
using concrete visual stimuli (e.g., Alibali, Heath, &
Myers, 2001). The participants’ gestures spatialized the
four elements of feedback systems in the following ways.
First, people located the factors (e.g., the predator and prey
populations in the negative feedback example) by placing
their gestures in space or by pointing to locations. These we
call factor reference gestures (see Fig. 1). Second, people rep-
resented changes to the factors (e.g., an increase in the
predator population) as movements. These we call factor
change gestures. Third, people represented causal relations
in the system (e.g., how the change in the predator popula-
tion causes a change in the prey population) as movements,
sometimes between previously established locations. These
we call causal relation gestures. Fourth, people used move-
ments to characterize the behavior of the system as a whole
(e.g., the equilibrium that is reached in the predator-prey
system). These we call whole system gestures. People also
gestured in a variety of other ways, such as to spatially con-
trast the two systems they read about (with the first system
in one location and the second in another), or to illustrate
an aspect of the system that was not one of the intended
causal factors (such as the increase in investor confidence
when stock values rise).Fig. 1 Examples of the different gesture types, taken from two participants
locations in space (yellow circles). Factor change gestures (b, f) represent inc
relation gestures (c, g) represent causation as movement (curved yellow arro
as a whole and often involve multiple movement phases (multiple yellow aSome gestures were unclear and could not be definitively
classified into one of the four categories or the ‘other’
category. Of those gestures that both coders judged to be
codable (80% of gestures analyzed), 79% (N = 177, Cohen’s
K = 0.67) were assigned to the same category.
Overall, the majority (476/666, or 71%) of participants’
representational gestures fell into one of the four spatial
types, with an average of 25.1 (SD = 9.0) such gestures per
explanation.1 In other words, participants spatialized the
system elements in gesture (25.1 per explanation) almost
four times as often as they spatialized them in speech (6.4
per explanation). Further details about the counts and rates
observed for each gesture type are given in Table 1. Subse-
quent analyses focus on those gestures that fit into the
categorization scheme.
Properties of gestures considered individually We
next analyzed the properties that these four gesture types
exhibited, starting with the spatial axis employed in each
gesture: left-right, toward-away, up-down, a combination of
axes (e.g., left-right and up-down), or no single axis. Factor
reference gestures were analyzed for the axis along which
the factors were located; factor change gestures, causal fac-
tor gestures, and whole system gestures were analyzed for
the axis along which movement was represented. Coders
agreed 89% (N = 114, Cohen’s K = 0.84) of the time in judg-
ing the spatial axis involved.
The vast majority of factor reference gestures located
the factors on the left-right axis (202/248, or 81%), most
often with the first-mentioned factor on the left and the
second-mentioned factor on the right. Factor change ges-
tures were more spatially variable, with 21% (37/176)’ explanations. Factor reference gestures (a, e) represent the factors as
reases and decreases as movements (straight yellow arrows). Causal
ws). Whole system gestures (d, h) represent the behavior of the system
rrows)
Table 1 Gesture counts and rates by type
Factor reference Factor change Causal relation Whole system Other or unclear Totals
Study 1
Number of gestures 248 176 32 20 190 666
Mean per explanation 13.1 9.3 1.7 1.1 10.0 35.0
Proportion of participants producing type 1.00 0.95 0.68 0.47 0.79 –
Study 2
Number of gestures 301 171 24 72 234 802
Mean per explanation 12.5 7.1 1.0 3.0 9.8 33.4
Proportion of participants producing type 1.00 0.92 0.46 0.83 0.96 –
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left-right axis, 29% (51/176) along the toward-away axis,
26% (45/176) along the up-down axis, and the remaining
24% (43/176) involving either some combination of these
axes (e.g., simultaneously upward and rightward) or a
more complex movement. Causal relation gestures most
commonly (24/32, or 75%) depicted causation as move-
ment along the left-right axis. The spatial properties of
whole system gestures were much more variable (see
below), with the majority not representing movement
along a single axis (11/20, or 55%).
Factor reference gestures locate abstract entities in dis-
tinct spatial locations. They either do this explicitly, as
when locating both factors simultaneously (Fig. 1a), or im-
plicitly, as when locating a single factor on one side of
space and implying a contrast with an unrepresented fac-
tor (Fig. 1e). The other three types of gestures represent
abstract relations spatially and thus provide a first type of
evidence that spatial analogies are at play. Factor change
gestures represent changes in quantity (a relation between
an entity at one point in time and the same entity at
another point in time) as movements. Causal relation
gestures represent a higher-order relation (that a change
in one factor results in a change in the other factor) as an
action through space. Finally, whole system gestures rep-
resent the system’s behavior through time as movement.
Importantly, these gestures differ in the complexity of
the relations represented. In particular, whole system
gestures summarize an entire system over time—not just
a single relation such as an increase—and thus would be
expected to be more spatially complex. To examine this
possibility, we analyzed the type of stroke involved in
the different gesture types. The stroke is the part of the
gesture that is meant to represent what is being de-
scribed (McNeill, 1992). The canonical gesture stroke is
simple in that it involves a single movement phase pro-
ceeding in a single direction, but gesture strokes can also
be more complex in several ways. In the case of concrete
iconic gestures, complex gesture strokes might occur, for
instance, when someone traces the outline of a square,
shows a repetitive action such as hammering, or depictsalternating action such as two weights oscillating on a
scale (for discussion of different stroke types, see McNeill,
1992, p. 308; Kita, Van Gijn, & Van der Hulst, 1998, 2014).
We considered gesture strokes complex if they had mul-
tiple movement phases (see Fig. 1d, h). Some strokes were
unclear with respect to complexity; for those gestures that
both coders considered codable (97% of gestures ana-
lyzed), agreement as to whether the stroke was simple or
complex was 96% (N = 137, PABAK = 0.91).2
As predicted, whole system gestures involved complex
strokes in 45% of cases (9/20), compared to 13% (58/456)
for the other gesture types (Fig. 2). While factor change
gestures, for instance, usually involve single, smooth
movements along particular spatial axes, whole system
gestures involve incremental upward movements, widen-
ing spirals, alternating upward and downward movements,
and so on (Fig. 3). We also examined the number of
participants who favored simple or complex strokes for
the different gesture types. A significant number of partic-
ipants favored simple strokes for factor reference (19/19,
two-tailed exact binomial test, p < 0.001), factor change
(17/18, two-tailed exact binomial test, p < 0.001), and
causal relation gestures (10/13, two-tailed exact binomial
test, p = 0.03). In contrast, a non-significant majority of
participants favored complex strokes for their whole sys-
tem gestures (5/9, two-tailed exact binomial test, p = 0.25).
Properties of gestures considered across the explanation
We next considered properties of people’s gestures across
their entire explanation. Our primary interest was whether
participants’ gestures were integrated into a larger ana-
logical model—in other words, whether people produced
an interconnected system of spatial gestures to represent an
interconnected system of entities and relations. This kind
of parallel interconnected structure is characteristic of ana-
logical mapping (Gentner, 1983). If a participant maintains
consistent, contrasting spatial locations for the factors,
these gestures would be considered model-integrated. By
contrast, if a participant locates the factors erratically from
one mention to the next, these gestures would not be con-
sidered model-integrated. Further, if a participant produces
Fig. 2 The proportion of gestures of different types that involved complex strokes
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rates the location of that factor as used over the course of
the explanation, the gesture would be considered model-
integrated. If, on the other hand, the increase was depicted
in neutral space, the gesture would not be considered
model-integrated. Similarly, if a participant produces a ges-
ture representing a causal relation between two factors as a
movement between the locations of the two factors as used
over the course of the explanation, the gesture would be
considered model-integrated (for examples, see Fig. 1c
and g). Alternatively, if the gesture represented causation
as a movement in neutral space, it would not be consid-
ered model-integrated. Note that we did not expect
whole system gestures, which depict a high-levelFig. 3 Schematic depictions of whole system gestures used to
characterize the dynamics of positive and negative feedback systemssummary of the behavior of the system, to be closely in-
tegrated with the low-level causal details depicted in the
other gestures.3 This gesture type was thus not included
in the analysis. Importantly, model-integration goes be-
yond mere spatial consistency. A speaker could produce
spatially consistent gestures when representing, for in-
stance, the notion of increase, without ever integrating
those increase gestures into a larger model.
Examples of two different gesture sequences are illus-
trated in Fig. 4, one with factor change gestures that are
model-integrated and one with factor change gestures that
are not. For some gestures it was hard to make a judgment
about whether or not they were model-integrated, and
they were coded as unclear. For those factor reference,
factor change, and causal relation gestures that both
coders judged to be codable (85% of gestures analyzed),
agreement as to whether the gestures were model-
integrated or not was 91% (N = 95, PABAK = 0.81).
Overall, 90% (224/248) of participants’ factor reference
gestures were model-integrated (mean percentage = 90%),
as were 49% (86/176) of their factor change gestures
(mean percentage = 53%), and 72% (27/32) of their causal
relation gestures (mean percentage = 64%). All partici-
pants (19/19) produced at least one model-integrated
factor reference gesture, 84% (16/19) of participants pro-
duced at least one model-integrated factor change gesture,
and 47% (9/19) produced at least one model-integrated
causal relation gesture. Three participants produced only
model-integrated gestures in their explanations: in one
case, 14 gestures (three factor reference, nine factor
change, two causal relation); in another, 15 gestures (five
factor reference, ten factor change); and in another, 12
Fig. 4 Examples of gestures that are model-integrated (sequence 1)
and gestures that are not model-integrated (sequence 2) produced
during explanations of negative feedback. Factor reference and factor
change gestures are indicated in blue for factor A and in green for
factor B. Note that the factor change gestures (the gestures with
arrows) in sequence 1 (b, c, d) are consistently produced in the
locations originally assigned to each factor (the dots in a). In contrast,
the factor change gestures in sequence 2 (the arrows in b and d)
are not produced in the locations assigned to the relevant factor
(the dots in a and c)
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times gestures expressed unconnected flashes of spatial
imagery (see Fig. 4, sequence 2), they often cohered
over the course of an explanation into a systematic ana-
logical model.Gestures in relation to speech
Finally, we analyzed the relationship between partici-
pants’ gestures and the language with which they were
co-produced. Most often, in 94% of cases (448/476), the
gestures represented aspects of the system that were
simultaneously mentioned in speech. For example, a par-
ticipant would produce a factor reference gesture while
referring in speech to “the first factor” or a factor change
gesture while mentioning an “increase”. Interestingly,
however, gestures sometimes filled in where speech left
off. Of the 20 whole system gestures, three (15%) were
produced without actually verbalizing the system behavior.
For example, a speaker describing a positive feedback sys-
tem said, “so it’s like this sort of…” trailing off in speech
but providing a spatial characterization in gesture. Con-
veying information in gesture and not in speech occurred
numerically less often for the other gesture types: in 5% of
cases for factor reference gestures, 5% for factor change
gestures, and 9% for causal relation gestures. The higher
rate observed for whole system gestures may stem from
difficulty in verbalizing the overall system dynamics. How-
ever, given the small number of observations, more data
are needed to confirm this pattern.
Lastly, we investigated the relationship between the
different gesture types and overt spatial language. If the
gesture’s verbal affiliate—the word or phrase that
expresses the same meaning as the gesture—included a
spatial word, the gesture was classified as occurring
with spatial language; otherwise, it was classified as
occurring with non-spatial language. Table 2 provides
examples of both spatial and non-spatial language that
was co-produced with the different gesture types.
Of the gestures that represented aspects of the system
that were simultaneously mentioned in speech, the over-
whelming majority (84% (403/448)) were co-produced
with non-spatial language. Given the paucity of spatial
ideas expressed in speech overall, as described earlier,
this result is unsurprising. However, the different gesture
types varied in how often they were produced with
spatial language. For example, factor reference gestures,
though consistently involving the left-right axis, were not
once co-produced with a reference to “left” or “right” and
were only co-produced with a spatial word in a single
instance (“external variable”). The other gesture types did
occur with spatial language, although less than half the
time: factor change 32%, causal relation 45%, and whole
system behavior 35%. Overall, these results confirm that
Table 2 Examples of spatial and non-spatial language
co-produced with gestures
Non-spatial language Spatial language
Factor reference “First factor” “External variable”
“Certain variable” –
“Factor A” –
Factor change “Increase” “Rise”
“Decrease” “Go up”
“Change” “Go down”
Causal relation “Influences” “Rebounds”
“Causes” “Leads to”
“Effects” “Impacts”
Whole system “Self-correcting” “Negative loop”
“Regulate each other” “Seesaw”
“Constant increasing” “Building on each other”
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comes out not in their words, but in their hands.
Discussion
When explaining positive and negative feedback systems
(two examples of complex relational patterns), partici-
pants recruited spatial representations in abundance. Ele-
ments of these systems were expressed spatially in gesture
almost four times as often as they were expressed spatially
in speech. These spatial gestures provided several types of
evidence that people were drawing extensively on spatial
analogy. First, participants produced individual gestures
that used space to represent abstract relations. These in-
cluded both simple relations, as in factor change gestures
that represented increases and decreases as movements
along axes, and complex relations, as in the whole system
gestures used to summarize the behavior of the entire sys-
tem. Second, considered in relation to each other, partici-
pants’ gestures were often integrated into larger analogical
models, as when depicting a causal relationship as move-
ment between previously established locations. Finally, the
spatial analogies as revealed in gesture very often occurred
without spatial language and, in some cases, without any
language at all. Spatial analogies are thus pervasive in
spontaneous gesture during complex relational reasoning,
and are not merely a manual echo of spatial speech.
One limitation of Study 1 was that, although the lesson
was largely devoid of rich imagistic content, it did include
a sprinkling of abstract spatial words. For example, the
words “direction” and “reversed” were used to describe
changes in the system. Importantly, participants produced
the same basic gesture types in their pre-lesson explana-
tions as in their post-lesson explanations—thus, the lessondid not seem to tip participants off to the idea of spatializ-
ing aspects of the system. Nonetheless, it remains possible
that the presence of spatial language increased partici-
pants’ propensity to spatialize their mental models of the
system. To address this possibility, in Study 2, we removed
the remaining spatial language from the Causal Systems
Lesson. If the abundant use of analogical gestures in Study
1 was cued by the spatial language in our lesson, these be-
haviors should be considerably dampened. A second aim
of Study 2 is to again examine whole system gestures
(which were relatively infrequent in Study 1)—specifically,
whether we will again find that they tend to involve com-
plex strokes.
Study 2: Causal systems lesson with spatial
language removed
Methods
The study was approved by the University of Chicago
Institutional Review Board, under protocol #IRB13-0248.
Participants
Thirty adults from the University of Chicago community
participated in exchange for course credit or cash. Six
participants were excluded from the analyses for differ-
ent reasons: three because of irregularities in the ex-
perimental procedure; two because many of their
gestures were occluded; and one for guessing our inter-
est in gesture during the debriefing. In all, data from 24
participants (16 female, mean age = 21.1 years) are re-
ported in the analysis.
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were the same as in Study
1, with the following exceptions to the sorting task and
the lesson.
Familiarization phase The structure of the sorting task
was modified in two ways from Study 1: first, participants
sorted 18 vignettes instead of 11; second, another seed card
was added, which was an example of a chain of causally re-
lated events. These two changes were aimed at developing
a more sensitive measure of causal systems understanding
than the measure used in Study 1. Participants were given
eight minutes for the expanded sorting task.
Causal systems lesson The written lesson was edited
for Study 2 (see Appendix 2). The primary change was
that spatial language was removed, at least to the extent
possible. Note that some abstract uses of prepositions
remain in certain stock uses (e.g., “a change in factor A,”
“begins to decrease”), as it is not possible to write intelli-
gible English without them. The post-lesson explanation
is again the focus of our analyses (see Appendix 4 for
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explanations).
Analysis
Videos were transcribed and analyzed in the same way
as in Study 1, and reliability was assessed by having a
second coder classify the gestures in six randomly se-
lected explanations (25% of the data).
Results
Sorting performance
Participants sorted the vignettes according to the appro-
priate causal structure the majority of the time (M = 0.75,
SD = 0.19). As in Study 1, however, the variability in sort-
ing performance was quite limited, with three quarters of
participants scoring above 61% (interquartile range = 0.61
to 0.89). Again, because of this limited variability, we do
not discuss relations between participants’ sorting per-
formance and their gestures.
Spatial ideas in speech
Participants expressed the four system elements spatially
in speech an average of 5.5 (SD = 4.2) times per explan-
ation, a rate comparable to Study 1.
Spatial ideas in gesture
Gesture rates and types Participant’s explanations lasted
85.5 seconds on average (SD = 33.1) and involved an aver-
age of 33.4 gestures (SD = 32.5), for a mean rate of 23.9
(SD = 8.9) representational gestures per minute speaking.
These rates are similar to those found in Study 1. Of those
gestures that both coders judged to be codable (83% of
gestures analyzed), 84% (N = 195, Cohen’s K = 0.77) were
assigned to the same category.
As in Study 1, the majority (568/802, or 71%) of par-
ticipants’ representational gestures fell into one of the
four types. Participants expressed an average of 23.7
(SD = 11.2) system elements spatially in their gestures.
In other words, they produced more than four times as
many spatial ideas in gesture (23.7 per explanation) as
they did in speech (5.5 per explanation). Observed
counts and rates of the different gesture types are given
in Table 1. Overall, the patterns mirror those observed
in Study 1, with the exception that more whole system
gestures were produced, and by a greater proportion of
the participants. This difference provides an opportunity
to revisit provisional observations made about whole
system gestures in Study 1.
Properties of gestures considered individually As in
Study 1, we first examined how the gestures used space,
with coders agreeing about the axis used in 82% (N = 172,
Cohen’s K = 0.70) of cases. The majority of factor refer-
ence gestures located the factors on the left-right axis(227/301, or 75%). Again, factor change gestures were
more variable, with 20% (35/171) depicting increases and
decreases as movements along the left-right axis, 18% (30/
171) along the toward-away axis, 32% (55/171) along the
up-down axis, and the remaining 30% (51/171) involving
either some combination of these axes or a more complex
movement. Causal relation gestures most commonly (16/
24, or 67%) depicted causation as movement along the
left-right axis. Most whole system gestures did not exhibit
movement along a single axis (64/72, or 89%).
Again, we investigated whether spatially complex
gestures were used to characterize relationally complex
concepts. For those gestures that both coders considered
codable (98% of gestures analyzed), agreement as to
whether a stroke was simple or complex was 95% (N =
145, PABAK = 0.90). Whole system gestures were complex
in 86% of cases (62/72), compared to 15% (74/496) for the
other types combined. Thus the pattern seen in Study 1,
but limited by the small number of observations, proved
to be robust in Study 2. A significant number of partici-
pants favored simple strokes for factor reference gestures
(23/24 participants, two-tailed exact binomial test, p <
0.001) and for factor change gestures (22/22 participants,
two-tailed exact binomial test, p < 0.001). Most partici-
pants (8/11) also favored simple strokes for causal relation
factors, but this bias did not reach significance (two-tailed
exact binomial test, p = 0.16). In contrast, a highly signifi-
cant number of participants (18/20) favored complex
strokes for their whole system gestures (two-tailed exact
binomial test, p < 0.001).
Properties of gestures considered across the
explanation We next analyzed gestures in relation to
other gestures produced in the same explanation. Again,
some gestures were considered unclear with respect to
model-integration. For those factor reference, factor
change, and causal relation gestures that both coders
judged to be codable (66% of gestures analyzed), agree-
ment as to whether the gestures were model-integrated
or not was 82% (N = 101, PABAK = 0.64). Overall, 85%
(256/301) of participant’s factor reference gestures (mean
percentage = 78%), 44% (75/171) of participants’ factor
change gestures (mean percentage = 42%), and 63% (15/
24) of their causal relation gestures (mean percentage =
64%) were model-integrated. Moreover, 96% (23/34) of
participants produced at least one model-integrated
factor reference gesture, 75% (18/24) at least one
model-integrated factor change gesture, and 38% (9/24)
least one model-integrated causal relation gesture.
Gestures in relation to speech
As in Study 1, the overwhelming majority of gestures
represented aspects of the system that were also men-
tioned in speech (546/568, or 96%), but this differed by
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rare for factor reference gestures (2%), factor change
gestures (1%), and causal relation gestures (0%), but oc-
curred numerically more frequently for whole system
gestures (21%). Whole system gestures in the absence
of speech were produced by eight participants. Partici-
pants turned to gesture when they had difficulty putting
complex relational ideas into words.
Finally, paralleling Study 1, we found that the bulk
of gestures were produced without overt spatial lan-
guage (483/546, or 88%). The gesture types were as-
sociated with spatial language to differing degrees, as
follows: factor reference 0%, factor change 18%, causal
relation 21%, and whole system behavior 49%. Exam-
ples of spatial and non-spatial references are included
in Table 2.
Discussion
In Study 2, we modified the Causal System Lesson to
remove spatial language. Despite this change—and mir-
roring the primary findings of Study 1—participants
showed strong evidence of drawing on spatial analogy
during their explanations. It appears that participants’
use of spatial analogy was spontaneous and not entirely
cued by the wording of the lesson. Moreover, Study 2
yielded more cases of whole system gestures, providing
stronger evidence that such gestures are more spatially
complex than other gestures types.
General discussion
In the two studies we investigated the possibility that
people would spontaneously use spatial analogies when
reasoning about positive and negative feedback, rela-
tional systems that are complex, widespread, and ab-
stract in nature. As a potential window onto such
hypothesized analogies, we examined the gestures people
produced as they explained the main characteristics of
these causal systems and the differences between them.
Despite the paucity of concrete visual imagery in the
lesson we provided—and, in Study 2, the lack of spatial
language—when people explained the systems, they ges-
tured at high rates. These gestures did not represent the
actual locations or movements of objects—rather, they
used space abstractly to represent the different factors in
the system, the changes to those factors, the causal rela-
tions between the factors, and the overall dynamics of
the system. Abstract system elements were thus spatia-
lized extensively in gesture. Importantly, these elements
were not often spatialized in speech, highlighting the
value of observing gesture in reasoning tasks.
The gestures we observed provided several strands of
evidence for the pervasiveness of spatial analogy in causal
systems reasoning. A first kind of evidence comes from
the gestures considered individually. Some gestures usedspace to represent relatively simple abstract relations. For
example, factor change gestures used movements to
represent changes in magnitude, and causal relation ges-
tures used movements to depict causation as movement
between the two factors. Other gestures used space to ex-
press relationally complex concepts. Whole system ges-
tures (e.g., illustrating a balance between two changes or a
pattern of incremental increase) used spatially complex
movements to capture the overall behavior of the system.
A second kind of evidence for the presence of spatial ana-
logies comes from gestures considered in relation to other
gestures within the same explanation. Gestures in many
explanations were not merely isolated fragments of spatial
imagery, but were knitted together into larger analogical
models. Interestingly, the stability of such models was
sometimes directly visible from the fact that people
would hold an earlier gesture in place while repre-
senting another aspect of the system with the other
hand (see Figs. 1 and 4). Such models exhibit a core
property of analogy (Gentner, 1983) in that they in-
volve a mapping between an interconnected system of
entities and relations in one domain and a parallel
system of interconnected spatial locations and move-
ments. Of course, not everyone produced an ana-
logical model that was fully realized (in the sense of
involving all gesture types) and fully systematic (in
the sense of each gesture being model-integrated).
However, most participants produced multiple gesture
types and at least some model-integrated gestures,
and a few participants were unwaveringly systematic.
Spatial analogies do not depend on spatial language
Research in recent decades has demonstrated a tight
relationship between gesture and speech, with the two
often “co-expressing” the same idea in two formats at
once (McNeill, 1992). Given such observations, we
might have guessed that abstract gestures would largely
be used along with overt spatial words like “rise” or
“loop”. Prior work has noted that abstract spatial
gestures sometimes occur without any tip-off in the co-
occurring speech (e.g., Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012;
Cienki, 1998; Cienki & Müller, 2008), but it has been un-
clear from these observations whether such cases are the
exception or the rule. Our results suggest that, at least
in explanations of causal systems, spatial language and
analogical gesture do not always go hand-in-hand. In
fact, gestures were sometimes the only medium in which
an idea surfaced at all, as when people trailed off in
speech but conveyed a sophisticated spatial analogy in
their hands. Moreover, the spatial analogies we observed
in gesture did not depend on giving people spatial lan-
guage in the lesson they were explaining. The lesson we
used in Study 1 did include a small amount of abstract
spatial language. However, participants produced the full
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their pre-lesson explanations. More decisively, in Study
2, we removed the abstract spatial language from the
lesson and saw no change in people’s propensity for pro-
ducing spatial analogies in gesture.Spatial analogies in STEM
Analogies are ubiquitous in STEM fields, and spatial
analogies appear to be especially so. Perhaps the best-
studied examples to date are maps, scale models, and
sketches (e.g., DeLoache, 2004; Forbus et al., 2011; Jee
et al., 2014; Kastens & Ishikawa, 2006; Uttal & Wellman,
1989). In such cases, a set of concrete spatial relations in
the world is mapped in schematic fashion to some
spatial representation of that world. The analogical map-
ping is thus between one spatial format and another
spatial format. By contrast, in the spatial analogies under
examination here, the mapping is between a purely ab-
stract set of entities and relations—including factors,
changes, causation, and overall system behavior—and a
set of spatial locations and spatial relations—locations,
movements, movements between locations, and an overall
system topology. Prior work has demonstrated that people
are able to understand spatial analogies of this abstract
type (Gattis & Holyoak, 1996; Gattis, 2001; Novick, 2001;
see also the causal diagramming task in Goldwater &
Gentner, 2015). The present work takes these prior ob-
servations one step further by showing that spatial ana-
logies are also produced in spontaneous behavior.
How might the present findings inform classroom
practice in the STEM fields? Analogical gestures are
evanescent, and—like gestures generally—are a less overt
medium of expression (see Goldin-Meadow, 2003), but
they are nonetheless relevant for the classroom in at
least two ways. First, what teachers do with their hands
when introducing relational abstractions like positive
and negative feedback may guide learning. Though not
much is known about how analogical gestures are proc-
essed, early evidence from the domain of temporal
thinking suggests that seeing abstract relational gestures
has powerful consequences for downstream reasoning
(Jamalian & Tversky, 2012). Second, students’ gestures
may help teachers identify outright misconceptions or
shaky understandings in their pupils (e.g., Alibali, Flevares,
& Goldin-Meadow, 1997). As our data show, analogical
gestures very often occur without spatial speech and
sometimes without any speech at all. Thus, in a small
group interaction, a teacher might notice that a student
uses a seesawing gesture to characterize what is, in fact, a
positive feedback system and then offer clarification. In
sum, analogical gestures may be an important medium
through which students learn from their teachers and
teachers learn about their students.An important issue for further research is whether
analogical gestures might reveal individual differences in
conceptual understanding, as gestures in other domains
have been found to do (e.g., Church & Goldin-Meadow,
1986; Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988; Pine,
Lufkin, & Messer, 2004). In our studies, we might have ex-
pected that students with more expert-like understanding
would be more likely to produce whole system gestures or
would exhibit more systematic gestural models. We did
not find evidence for such relationships, but this may be
due to low variability in our sorting task. In other popula-
tions, or with more intensive measures of expert-like un-
derstanding, such relationships may well emerge. Another
way that gesture could reveal expert-like understanding is
suggested by work on how students understand emergent
processes. Chi et al. (2012) propose that to deeply under-
stand such a system, it is not enough for a student to
understand the low-level elements and dynamics of the
system (in our studies, the factors, factor changes, and
causal relations binding them) and the high-level dy-
namics of the system (in our studies, the whole system
behavior); the student must also understand how the
low-level behavior generates the high-level behavior.
Future work could examine whether gesture provides
evidence that students understand such connections
between levels, using feedback systems or other types of
complex systems where misconceptions are common
(Chi et al., 2012; Jacobson et al., 2011).
A final point is that spatial analogies may play important
roles in teaching and learning in STEM whether or not
they are expressed in gesture. In the case of causal sys-
tems, such analogies may also be expressed and under-
stood through diagrams (Ainsworth, Prain, & Tytler,
2011; Forbus et al., 2011; Goldwater & Gentner, 2015)
and they can even be glimpsed—albeit in fragmentary
fashion—in everyday language, as when we refer to
“feedback loops” or “domino effects”. In fact, analogies
may play important roles even when they go com-
pletely unexpressed: students working on problems
alone, reading texts, or listening to lectures may still
be engaging in backstage spatial reasoning. If space is
a format in which students intuitively think about
complex relational structures, then we may want to
design materials, classroom activities, and assessments
accordingly.
Why are spatial analogies pervasive?
Why did our participants produce analogical gestures in
such abundance? And how might the spatial analogies
we see in gesture relate to the ones seen in diagrams,
such as those sometimes used in STEM education? One
possibility is that people create spatial analogies in ges-
ture because of their familiarity with spatial analogies
from diagrams. An alternative possibility is that people
Cooperrider et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:28 Page 13 of 17create spatial analogies in both gesture and in diagrams
for the deeper reason that space is an especially intuitive
format for reasoning about relational structure (see Gattis,
2001, for discussion). One reason that space is so intuitive
may be that its relational structure is deeply familiar,
even at a young age. Of course, these possible rela-
tionships between gestures and diagrams are not mu-
tually exclusive: gesture and diagramming could both
ultimately spring from an urge to spatialize relational
structure while, at the same time, shaping each other
to some degree.
The idea that space is an intuitive format for reasoning
about relational structure is supported by the fact that
spatial analogy crops up routinely in everyday communi-
cation. Consider an example from a 2012 public hearing
on public transportation funding in San Francisco.4 At
issue are proposed budget cuts to a program that subsi-
dizes bus rides for low-income youth. During the hearing,
a concerned commenter laments the apparent “tradeoff
between maintenance and this program”. As she says
“tradeoff” she holds her hands on either side of her body
and rocks them up and down. In one complex stroke,
the gesture represents the idea that as financial support
for one (maintenance) increases, support for the other
(the subsidy program) decreases. Other everyday ideas
that may be illustrated in analogical gestures include
relational abstractions like reciprocity, tit-for-tat, give-
and-take, and many others (for additional discussion,
see Beaudoin-Ryan & Goldin-Meadow, 2014; Cooperrider
& Goldin-Meadow: When gesture becomes analogy,
submitted).
The propensity to set up and use spatial analogical
models has also been noted in established sign languages
(Emmorey, 2014). Such a propensity is evident in the
phenomenon known as “spatial modulation” (Senghas &
Coppola, 2001; see also Liddell, 1995), which resembles
the model-integrated gestures found in our data. In
American Sign Language (ASL), for example, a verb may
be said to be “spatially modulated” if it incorporates
spatial information that was previously established for
one or more of its arguments. Thus, to describe a person
giving a book to someone else, an ASL signer would as-
sign locations to the giver and to the recipient and then
produce the sign GIVE along a path from the former to
the latter. As our data show, hearing gesturers do
something similar under the right circumstances (see
also So, Coppola, Licciardello, & Goldin-Meadow,
2005). Together, these cases suggest that analogical ges-
tures—and their counterpart, analogical signs—are a
broader phenomenon outside the laboratory.
Space may be so intuitive as a format for relational
reasoning, in fact, that people use it automatically. Ana-
logy is sometimes thought of as the product of an effort-
ful attempt to communicate a complex idea. However,empirical work has shown that this formulation is often
misleading: analogical mapping can occur unintention-
ally, without any effort (Day & Gentner, 2007; see also
Steen, 2008). We suggest that a similar unintentional
deployment of analogy may be at work in our studies.
Participants could have referred to their gestures—or to
the spatial information contained therein—explicitly
(e.g., “Imagine the system is like this”), but they did not.
Nor did they show signs of engaging in an effortful
process of design and development, as might be signaled
by restarts or amendments to the spatial structure. Ra-
ther, participants appeared to construct their spatial ana-
logies fluidly and more or less effortlessly as they
articulated the relational structure they were describing.
Given the seeming automaticity with which analogical
gestures were produced in our explanation task, an intri-
guing possibility is that they may have been helpful to
the speaker. Prior work has argued that producing repre-
sentational gestures aids conceptualization (e.g., Kita,
2000) and learning (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Cook, &
Mitchell, 2009), and has shown that gesturing during
explanations can reduce cognitive load (e.g., Goldin-
Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001). To our
knowledge, however, cognitive benefits of this sort have
not been shown for analogical gestures of the type de-
scribed here, and, if spatial analogy is indeed an effortful
process, then producing analogical gestures could in-
crease cognitive load rather than lighten it. However,
one serendipitous observation lends weight to the possi-
bility that gestures helped people reason in our studies:
a handful of participants produced gestures while read-
ing the lesson to themselves, and these gestures often
formed extended sequences like those produced during
the explanations. Other work has described such “co-
thought gestures” in the case of concrete spatial reason-
ing tasks, such as mental rotation, and has shown that
that they benefit reasoning (Chu & Kita, 2011; see also
Jamalian, Giardino, & Tversky, 2013). Speculatively, the
silent flurries of spatial gesture we observed may have
helped participants encode the relational structure of the
systems they were reading about.
Conclusion
Complex relational patterns underlie diverse phenom-
ena across the natural and social worlds. While earlier
work has demonstrated the difficulties of reasoning
about such patterns, much remains to be understood
about the representations people bring to bear during
such reasoning. Here we provide evidence that spon-
taneous spatial analogies pervade explanations of causal
systems, and that gesture is an important—sometimes
the only—medium through which such analogies are
expressed. Indeed, evidence for such analogies would
have been scarce from a verbal transcript alone.
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remains plausible that spatial analogies lie at the core
of the human ability to understand complex relational
phenomena.
Endnotes
1Participants also produced these same four gesture
types in their pre-lesson explanations (see Appendix
4). However, we do not analyze these explanations in
detail because they were shorter and more variable
in terms of what participants talked and gestured
about.
2For two of our coding categories—stroke complex-
ity and model integration—we report the Prevalence-
Adjusted Bias-Adjusted Kappa, or PABAK. In these
cases, one of the two coding categories is much
more prevalent than the other, which complicates the
interpretation of Cohen’s Kappa (Byrt, Bishop, &
Carlin, 1993).
3As noted by other researchers, systems often exhibit
behavior at a zoomed-out, macro-level that is qualitatively
distinct from the behavior they exhibit at a zoomed-in,
micro-level. For discussion, see Chi et al. (2012) and Smith
and Gentner (2014).
4The example comes from an online database, the TV
News Archive, and can be viewed at the following link
(accessed 16 June 2016): https://archive.org/details/
SFGTV_20120422_210000#start/180/end/240.
Appendix 1
Basic Causal Systems Lesson (Study 1)
The brief paragraphs you just read give examples of
different types of causal systems. Consider the first
one:
When stocks are rising (a bull market), investors
commonly believe that further rises are probable,
and begin to buy more stocks. This buy-up increases
the confidence of other investors and inspires them
to buy as well. Many economists believe that this
principle is occurring in the current housing boom.
People are buying houses expecting the value to
keep on rising.
In this example, a change in one factor (stock
prices rising) causes a change in another factor (more
buying activity) which then leads to a further change
(stocks rising even more). More generally, in this type
of causal system a change in one element in the sys-
tem—factor A—causes a change in another ele-
ment—factor B—which then leads to further change
in factor A in the same direction as the original
change. Overall, the initial change in factor A is fur-
thered in this type of system.
This type of system contrasts with the one described
in the other paragraph:Predator/prey populations of animals sometimes follow
a very predictable pattern. If the prey population increases
in number, the predator population has more food and in-
creases as well. At some point the predator population
over eats and the prey population begins to decline in
number. Consequently, the predator population decreases
with the scarcity of available food.
In this example, a change in one factor (growth in
the predator population) causes a change in another
factor (decline in the prey population) which then
leads to a further change (decline in the predator
population). More generally, in this a change in one
element of the system—factor A—causes a change in an-
other element—factor B—which then leads to change in
factor A in the opposite direction to the original change.
Overall, the initial change in factor A is reversed in this
type of system.
Appendix 2
Causal Systems Lesson with spatial language removed
(Study 2)
The brief paragraphs you just read give examples of
different types of causal systems. Consider the first
one:
When stock values are increasing (a bull market), in-
vestors commonly believe that further increases are
probable, and begin to buy more stocks. This increases
the price of stocks. As stock prices increase, investors
become more confident, and their rate of stock-buying
increases. Many economists believe that this pattern is
what causes stock market bubbles.
In this example, a change in one factor (stock prices
increasing) causes a change in another factor (more buy-
ing activity), which then causes an additional change in
the first factor (stock prices increasing even more). More
generally, in this type of causal system a change in one
element in the system—factor A—causes a change in an-
other element—factor B—which then causes additional
change in factor A that is the same as the original
change. Overall, the initial change in factor A is perpetu-
ated in this type of system.
This type of system contrasts with the one described
in the following paragraph:
Predator/prey populations of animals sometimes fol-
low a very predictable pattern. If the prey population
increases in number, the predator population has
more food and increases as well. At some point the
predator population over eats and the prey population
begins to decrease in number. Consequently, the
predator population decreases with the scarcity of
available food.
In this example, a change in one factor (increase in the
prey population) causes a change in another factor (in-
crease in the predator population), which then causes an
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population). More generally, in this type of system a
change in one element of the system—factor A—causes
a change in another element—factor B—which then
causes a change in factor A that is the opposite of the
original change. Overall, the initial change in factor A is
corrected in this type of system.
Appendix 3
Spatial language coding procedure
1) To decide whether a gesture was accompanied by
spatial language, we examined the lexical or phrasal af-
filiate of the gesture. For the gestures we are analyzing,
the lexical or phrasal affiliate is the part that refers to
the factor reference (e.g., “factor A”), the factor change
(e.g., “increases”), causation (e.g., “causes”), or the whole
system behavior (e.g., “oscillates”). In the case of a
phrase, if any of the words is considered spatial (accord-
ing to the following criteria) the gesture is considered to
be “co-produced with spatial language”.
2) Co-produced language was transcribed during the
gesture coding. The presence of spatial language was
determined from this transcription. However, in cases
of ambiguities in usage, the video was examined to
consider the fuller context.
3) Words were considered spatial if the first definition
listed in the American Heritage Dictionary (5th edition)
was overtly and uniquely spatial in that it referred to
movement, action, shape, configuration, or size.
Notes:
a) The definition consulted was for the part of speech
that was actually used. Some words have spatial defini-
tions when used as one part of speech, but non-spatial
definitions (by our criteria) when used as another. For
example, “reverse” is overtly spatial when used as a verb
but is not when used as a noun.
b) Some words are defined in an abstract way that
covers both spatial and non-spatial uses. We only
consider words spatial if they do not also have a non-
spatial sense given in the same definition—in other
words, if they are uniquely spatial. For example, “in-
crease” is defined in some dictionaries as “become or
make greater in size, amount, intensity, or degree”.
This one definition encompasses both overtly spatial
(size) and non-spatial (amount, intensity, and degree)
meanings.
c) In some cases, spatial words are used as part of
conventional phrases that have holistic meanings. This
includes, for instance, “turn” in the phrase “in turn”.
These were not considered spatial unless the phrase it-
self has a spatial meaning. Spatial prepositions (“in,”
“on,” “to”, etc.) were not considered spatial when they
are part of stock phrases. For example, a “change in” or
a “change to” are not considered spatial.d) In case of ambiguity in the spatiality of the defin-
ition, example utterances were consulted.
e) If the American Heritage Dictionary (5th edition)
did not list a separate definition for a common phrase,
Google’s built in dictionary was consulted.
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